My printer is on network at address 192.168.138.250 .

First add CUPS:

sudo pacman -Sy cups cups-browsed bluez-cups cups-pdf
sudo systemctl enable cups    
sudo systemctl start cups

Then some other dependencies (and drivers, if you want to use some other type than Epson L3150):

sudo pacman -Sy system-config-printer
sudo pacman -Sy nss-mdns
sudo pacman -Sy foomatic-db foomatic-db-ppds  
sudo pacman -S foomatic-db-nonfree foomatic-db-nonfree-ppds

And we should install the driver for L3150, which can be achieved with an AUR package (Epson only offer .deb and .rpm packages officially):

Does it work?

Disclaimer: I have been a user of almost every email provider mentioned below, and I am not affiliated with any of them.

You can read Forward Email’s comparison with many providers here: https://forwardemail.net/en/blog/forward-email-vs-mailbox-org-email-service-comparison , by substituting mailbox.org with others on their list.

In short, Forward Email has some wrong information. They attempt to achieve full score in every security test and prove they are superior to their competitors with scores. I don’t know what is driving Forward Email towards being a pupil, and it seems like many privacy seekers get trapped into how high they score in the Internet.nl tests.

Disclaimer: this post is a machine translation of the original Chinese version. Please refer to the original content for accurate information.

Preface

Keyoxide is similar to Keybase.io, used for verifying the identity consistency of online accounts.

For example, search for contact@forgejo.org on Keyoxide.org, and you’ll see that Forgejo owns a Mastodon instance account @forgejo@floss.social, the domain forgejo.org, and a Forgejo instance account @forgejo@codeberg.org.

You can also search using OpenPGP public key fingerprints. For instance, search for my fingerprint (which can be found on the “Contact” page) on Keyoxide.org, and you’ll see that Yuki claims ownership of accounts such as ActivityPub, Matrix, Forgejo, as well as the domain obsp.de.

Earlier this month I wrote an article with the title Encryption in Email Practice. My point of view is pretty straightforward, “encryption not complete means no encryption at all”, and people should stop relying on email for any secret or privacy. Nevertheless, people would not just stop because I (and many others) said don’t, as the inertia of communication is hard to revert.

The most interesting article I have read as an email enthusiast should be E-mail providers - which one to choose?, as the author themself appears to be a super paranoid and the ultimate seeker of privacy. The inspection method they have used is not technical, as they basically went through the privacy policy page of each provider and tried to sign up through Tor. Their criteria is at least extreme and trivial, if not hilarious: